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  Apparent ignorance of more than a century of economic history now threatens the 
competitive constitution of the Internet under the guise of “net neutrality.” Net neutrality is a 
slogan that stands for the proposition that the Internet and physical means of access to it should 
be available to all on uniform, non-discriminatory terms. Proponents of net neutrality fear, first, 
that access to bottlenecks, such as the “last mile” to the home, will be monopolized and second, 
that the successful monopolist will seek to favor its own vertical services by excluding or 
disfavoring others. Net neutrality is their answer to these threats. But the architects of the 
concept of net neutrality have simply resurrected the traditional naïve “common carrier” solution 
to the threats they fear. By choosing new words to describe a solution discredited by experience, 
the architects and economic interests supporting net neutrality may mislead themselves and 
others into repeating a policy error much more likely to harm consumers than to promote 
competition and innovation.  
  Net neutrality policies could only be implemented through detailed price regulation, an 
approach that has often failed, in the past, to improve consumer welfare relative to what might 
have been expected under an unregulated monopoly. Regulatory agencies often settle into a well-
established pattern of subservience to politically influential economic interests. Consumers, 
would-be entrants and innovators are not likely to be among these influential groups. History 
thus counsels against adoption of most versions of net neutrality, at least in the absence of 
refractory monopoly power and strong evidence of anticompetitive behavior—extreme cases 
justifying dangerous, long shot remedies. 
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  Apparent ignorance of more than a century of economic and regulatory history now 
threatens the competitive constitution of the Internet under the guise of “net neutrality.” Net 
neutrality is a slogan that stands for the proposition that the Internet and physical means of 
access to it should be available to all on uniform, non-discriminatory terms. Some net neutrality 
proponents go further, and argue that firms providing physical components of the Internet should 
not be permitted to offer different qualities of service, even if prices differ accordingly, and even 
if any customer can opt for any quality of service.  
  Proponents of net neutrality fear, first, that access to bottlenecks, such as the “last mile” 
to the home, will be monopolized and second, that the successful monopolist will seek to favor 
its own vertical services by excluding or disfavoring others. Net neutrality is their answer to 
these threats. But the architects of the concept of net neutrality have invented nothing new. They 
have simply resurrected the traditional but uncommonly naïve “common carrier” solution to the 
threats they fear. By choosing new words to describe a solution already well understood by 
another name, the economic interests supporting net neutrality may mislead themselves and 
others into repeating a policy error much more likely to harm consumers than to promote 
competition and innovation.  
  Net neutrality policies could only be implemented through detailed price regulation, an 
approach that has generally failed, in the past, to improve consumer welfare relative to what 
might have been expected under an unregulated monopoly. Worse, regulatory agencies often 
settle into a well-established pattern of subservience to politically influential economic interests. 
Consumers, would-be entrants and innovators are not likely to be among these influential groups. 
History thus counsels against adoption of most versions of net neutrality, at least in the absence 
of refractory monopoly power and strong evidence of anticompetitive behavior—extreme cases 2 
justifying dangerous, long shot remedies. My goal is this note is to add an historical perspective 
to the framing of the net neutrality debate.
1
 
2. Lessons of History 
 
  History, of course, can be a useful adjunct to analysis of policy alternatives. Proponents 
of net neutrality may recognize their own fears and goals, for example, in the following 120-
year-old statement: 
… [T]he paramount evil chargeable against the operation of the transportation system of 
the United States as now conducted is unjust discrimination between persons, places, 
commodities, or particular descriptions of traffic. The underlying purpose and aim of the 
[proposed legislation] is the prevention of these discriminations. . . .
2
 
This is from the legislative history of the first modern attempt by the federal government to 
regulate directly the behavior of large firms, in this case railroads. The result was the 1887 Act to 
Regulate Commerce, which contained this key provision: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any common carrier [railroad] subject to the provisions of this 
act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular 
person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in 
any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, 
or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice 
or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
3
 
This and subsequent legislation gave the now-defunct Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
the power to prevent discrimination of the kind feared by proponents of net neutrality. The policy 
did not work. Railroads continued to discriminate, charging different prices for hauling different 
commodities. Railroad tariffs grew longer and more complex each decade. In the end, before it 
                                                           
1  A brief and readable summary of the technical and economic issues is available online: Christopher S. Yoo and 
Timothy Wu, “Keeping the Internet Neutral: A Debate" (December 28, 2006). Vanderbilt Public Law Research 
Papers No. 06-27 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=953989. Wu and Yoo frame the policy issues using 
economic theories of the consequences for consumer welfare of vertical and horizontal integration by producers. 
Their differences are nuanced, based largely on different subjective takes on the weights to be placed on technical 
and economic risks. For example, where Wu sees a dangerous duopoly of Bells and cable companies, Yoo sees 
unfolding competition from new advances in wireless broadband and satellite technology. A recent paper by 
Professor Yoo provides a much more detailed recital of the academic, legislative, judicial and regulatory history of 
the debate through mid-2006. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 
Georgetown Law J. 1847 (2006). 
2 Senate Report No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 215, as quoted by Justice Hughes in Houston East and West Texas 
Railway Company v. United States 234 U.S. 342, 356 (1914), describing the purpose of §3 of An Act to Regulate 
Commerce, 24 Stat. 379, 390 §3 (1887).  
3  24 Stat. 379, 390 §3 (1887). 3 
was abolished in 1995, the ICC was little more than the titular head of a series of highly 
discriminatory and dysfunctional regional transport cartels. There are few today who believe that 
this century-long experiment with regulation achieved net benefits for Americans. 
  We have more recent evidence in telecommunications itself of the intractable difficulty of 
preventing discrimination, in this case by vertically integrated monopolies. Few historical events 
resonate in telecommunications policy with the clarity of the 1982 settlement that terminated the 
trial in U.S. v. AT&T.
4  Old AT&T agreed to settle by accepting the entire relief package sought 
by the government.
5 The relief called for a platonically pure structural disintegration and future 
isolation of the local Bell telephone monopolies from the competitive services then offered by 
AT&T, including long distance service and equipment manufacturing. The reason: regulation 
had failed to prevent discrimination against AT&T’s competitors. 
 
3. The Specter of Vertical Integration
 
  The current net neutrality debate has taken place in the rhetorical equivalent of the fog of 
war. The originators of the debate chose to invent new language to describe both a familiar 
economic problem and a familiar legal and regulatory solution to that problem.
6 Much of the 
popular writing by pro-neutrality advocates is maddeningly vague and heavy with sloganeering. 
Their argument seems tailored chiefly for political effect, rather than analytical rigor. It has taken 
several years for scholars on both sides to penetrate the fog.  
  Translated into the language used by economists, the debate is about preventing bad 
(anti-competitive) behavior by vertically integrated firms that enjoy market power at one stage or 
another of the vertical chain of production. For example, Alcoa, which once enjoyed a U.S. 
monopoly on aluminum ingot, was accused by the Justice Department in the 1930s of 
foreclosing competition in certain fabricated aluminum products. Alcoa made and sold fabricated 
products in competition with independent firms, for which Alcoa was the only source of ingot. 
                                                           
4 Merrill Brown and Caroline E. Mayer, U.S. Ends Antitrust Suits Against AT&T, IBM, The Washington Post Jan 9, 
1982. 
5 The government’s requested structural relief was set out in broad terms in Testimony of Bruce M. Owen on behalf 
of the United States, United States of America v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., et al., Case 74-168 
USDC—DDC, Trial Trans. June 22, 1981 at 10,938-11,084. 
6 “Net neutrality” and “end to end principle” for example are semantically unnecessary terms for the old ideas 
“common carrier access” and “interconnection obligation,” respectively. Jettisoning the old language also threatens 
to discard the experience that it tags. 4 
The government’s idea was that Alcoa could charge a high price for its ingot and thus impose a 
price floor on its competitors, in effect cartelizing the fabricated products businesses. Later in the 
20th century antitrust lawyers and many economists began to find this sort of problem under 
virtually every vertically-integrated rock, even when there was no monopoly at any stage of 
production. By 1977 vertical integration hysteria had peaked, and in that year the Supreme Court 
reversed course, recognizing that vertical integration often is pro-competitive.
7
  The consensus view nowadays is that vertical integration is simply an instance of the 
determination of the scope of firms, as distinct from markets.
8 Firms make resource allocation 
decisions by internal fiat, using organizational tools such as management hierarchies. Markets 
allocate resources through arms-length transactions among decentralized actors.  Much of the 
time markets work very efficiently, but there is a variety of conditions under which firms do 
better. Hence, goods and services are produced and sold by firms with various degrees of 
horizontal and vertical integration. Generally, firms can be said to compete with markets as 
venues for resource allocation.  
  Abstract economic models predict that when allocation within a firm replaces what had 
been decentralized market exchanges, consumer welfare (present and also future, because of 
incentives for innovation) may increase or decrease. In other words, the economic incentive to 
expand horizontally or vertically is usually but not always compatible with the social interest in 
maximizing long run consumer welfare. We have two tools to deal with the possible bad 
outcomes: antitrust policy and regulation. 
 
4. The Checkered History of Regulation
 
  Antitrust policy works by seeking to prevent, directly or through deterrence, welfare-
reducing expansions in the scope of firms, without indirectly deterring expansions that benefit 
consumers. This is easy to say, but very tough to accomplish in practice; the requisite 
information is difficult to assemble and assess, and the same tools (e.g., statements of 
enforcement policy and appellate precedents) can have indirect deterrent effects on both good 
and bad changes in the scopes of firms.  
                                                           
7 Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
8 Ronald H. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 (Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405, 
and Oliver Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies (1975) are the seminal works. 5 
  Hard as it is to calibrate antitrust policy, regulation is even more difficult. Aimed at 
improving serious long term structural incompatibility between private incentives and social 
welfare, regulatory tools intervene continuously and directly in firm decisions. The simplest case 
is the incentive of a monopolist to restrict output in order to maximize profit. Traditionally, 
public utility regulators set maximum prices and required utilities to serve all comers at or below 
those prices. In principle this might achieve an efficient level of output. But in practice, the 
constraint itself almost invariably produces incentives that distort internal allocation decisions of 
regulated firms, raising costs. In addition to these distortions, regulatory agencies themselves 
frequently have been more concerned with the welfare of the firms they regulate than with the 
economic welfare of the public. In many cases, consumers would have been better off without 
regulation. The starkest evidence:  deregulation of airlines, trucking and most rail rates actually 
produced lower prices. 
  A relevant example of regulatory distortion is the incentive to expand the scope of the 
firm vertically into the sale of unregulated products, and a concomitant incentive to exclude 
competitors from such markets. This was the central economic basis for the Justice Department 
litigation, seeking to disintegrate the old AT&T vertically, that was commenced in 1974 and led 
to the 1982 settlement and the actual breakup in 1984.
9 The policy basis for the lawsuit was the 
failure of the FCC, despite many years of effort, to prevent AT&T from finding ways to keep 
competitors out of potentially competitive markets into which it had integrated vertically. FCC 
staff officials testified in the trial of the case that, despite strenuous effort, their interventions had 
failed. 
  Behind the failure of the FCC’s attempts to control AT&T’s anticompetitive behavior 
were AT&T’s control of the information (about, for example, its costs) required by regulators to 
monitor and control the company’s behavior, AT&T’s control of the definitions of its services 
and the default pricing of those services, and the inherent constraints of administrative law on 
agency behavior. A leading example of these problems is the series of regulatory proceedings 
called Computer Inquiry I, Computer Inquiry II, and Computer Inquiry III.
10
                                                           
9 Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen, “United States v. AT&T: The Economic Issues,” in Kwoka and White, eds., 
The Antitrust Revolution, 1988; 2nd ed. 1994. 
10 COMPUTER I: Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Service Facilities: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 
(1970), Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff'd in part sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 
F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1973), decision on remand, Order, 40 F.C.C.2d 293 (1973). 6 
  In Computer Inquiries I, II and III, the FCC sought to find an effective method to permit 
the old AT&T to provide services in unregulated competitive markets, while assuring that AT&T 
would not or could not engage in anticompetitive behavior in those markets. Among the 
regulatory strategies explored in these proceedings was the concept of the “fully separated 
subsidiary,” a corporate unit organized to provide competitive services that was separated by an 
accounting firewall from the monopoly side of the business.  
  But it became apparent that a meaningful accounting separation was impossible, so long 
as the benefits from permitting AT&T to continue to supply inputs both to its own competitive 
downstream businesses and to the competitors it faced in those businesses arose from economies 
of scope or scale in the joint provision of inputs to both monopoly and competitive markets.
11 
For example, there exists no unique economically legitimate allocation of joint and common 
costs. In any case, so long as AT&T owned both the regulated monopoly business and the related 
competitive business, anticompetitive incentives would persist. The Computer rulemakings 
ended in morasses of complex, unworkable and ineffective or self-defeating regulations. 
  Remarkably similar problems arose in a series of negotiations between AT&T and the 
Antitrust Division, intended to lead to a settlement of the antitrust litigation. These negotiations 
took place, both at the end of the Carter Administration and in again the early years of the 
Reagan Administration. The talks ended in complex regulatory proposals ultimately abandoned 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  COMPUTER II: Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry): Tentative Decision, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), recon., 
Mem. Op. and Order 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1981), further recon., Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 
(1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n. v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), aff'd on second further recon., Mem. Op. and Order, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 301 
(1984). 
  COMPUTER III: Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third 
Computer Inquiry): Report & Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986), recon., Phase I Reconsideration Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 
3035 (1987), further recon., Order on Further Reconsideration, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988), second further recon., Order 
on Second Further Reconsideration, 4 F.C.C.R. 5927 (1989), Report & Order and Phase I Reconsideration Order 
vacated sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990), decision on remand, Computer III Remand 
Proceedings: Report and Order, 5 F.C.C.R. 7719 (1990).  
  See also the FCC’s related essay at “Open Network Architecture” (ONA), in Filing and Review of Open 
Network Architecture Plans: Phase I Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1 (1988), modified on recon., Order on Reconsideration, 5 
F.C.C.R. 3084 (1990), further recon., Order on Further Reconsideration, 5 F.C.C.R. 3103 (1990), and Amendment 
Of Part 69 Of The Commission's Rules Relating To The Creation Of Access Charge Subelements For Open 
Network Architecture: Report and Order & Order on Further Reconsideration & Supplemental Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 6 F.C.C.R. 4524 (1991).
11  In contrast to long distance markets, vertical integration by AT&T was not a serious impediment to the 
introduction of competition into equipment manufacture. Equipment manufacturing and provision of local telephone 
service had few common costs or other sources of economies of scope. The chief barrier to competition in telephone 
equipment was simply the FCC’s decades-long willingness to enforce AT&T’s desire to be free of competition. 7 
by both sides as unworkable. They were referred to by the parties as Quagmire I and Quagmire 
II.
12  
  AT&T Chairman Charles Brown later explained his decision to accept the relief sought 
by the government in the antitrust case. The “quagmire” of unworkably detailed regulatory 
solutions that seemed inevitably to emerge from efforts to solve the underlying problem of 
incentive incompatibility (not his phrase) led him to conclude that isolation of the monopoly 
portion of the business from its competitive components (the relief requested from the court by 
the Antitrust Division) was the only way AT&T would be able to escape endless private and 
public disputes with competitors and regulators, and become free to focus on its business of 
providing communication services. AT&T therefore capitulated.
13 
  Unfortunately, Judge Harold Greene had not had the benefit of the Computer Inquiries 
and Quagmire experience. When the government and AT&T filed the proposed settlement, with 
its stark and permanent isolation of the monopoly local service companies from participation in 
any competitive business requiring use of their monopoly facilities, Judge Greene rejected the 
platonic solution. He made exceptions for certain “information” services, and he insisted on a 
waiver process, permitting the local monopolies to enter competitive lines of business on a case 
by case basis with the court’s consent.
14 Predictably, the court was subsequently bogged down in 
massive and bitter multi-year waiver proceedings, most of which recapitulated the lessons of the 
Computer Inquiries and the Quagmires.  
  Despite Judge Greene’s misstep, the temporary isolation of the Bell companies from long 
distance service, combined with growing competition from wireless telephone providers, was 
sufficient to permit competition to develop in long distance service. The AT&T settlement 
ultimately was undone by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, which sought to solve the problem 
of competitive access to monopoly local telephone facilities by, among other policies, providing 
for the further (accounting) disintegration of local telephone facilities into “network elements,” 
each to be offered and priced separately to businesses seeking to compete with the local Bells.
15 
                                                           
12 Economic Report of the President (1996) Chapter 6, 171. Also, and for related background, Alvin Von Auw, 
Heritage and Destiny: AT&T - The Story of the Biggest Company Breakup on Earth (1983); Peter Temin with Louis 
Galambos, The Fall of the Bell System, (1987).  
13 Von Auw and Temin, supra, offer much more detailed versions of this story. 
14 United States v. AT&T (Modified Final Judgment), 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. 
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
15 Telecommunications Act of 1996, P.L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996), Section 251(3)(2)(B)); see 47 U. S. C. 
§251(c). 8 
The resulting FCC implementation procedures were repeatedly challenged by the Bells, resulting 
in several trips to the Supreme Court.
16 The 1996 Telecommunication Act failed to induce 
facilities-based entry into local wire line telephony. Instead, market forces took an end run 
around the Bell bottleneck.  
  The arrival of competition in local telephony (and, as it turned out, video services) was 
made possible by the advance of digital and wireless technology and continuing reductions in the 
hardware costs of providing such services. Today, cell phone companies and cable television 
companies offer local phone services that compete with the former Bell telephone monopolies. 
Competition has finally come to local telephone service, not because of a century of government 
regulation, but in spite of it. 
 
5. Those Who Do Not Study History Are Doomed to Repeat It
 
  The history of attempts to regulate the old AT&T under traditional utility regulation 
principles (common carrier access rules and maximum price regulation) suggests some lessons 
for communications policy today. These lessons recapitulate the story of the earlier attempts to 
control discrimination in rail service.  
  First, as the examples above attest, there is little clear evidence that traditional regulation 
ever achieved even its narrow objective of making non-discriminatory service available to all at 
cost-based prices. On the contrary, discrimination on the basis of factors correlated with price 
elasticity has been a commonplace of regulation from the time of the 1887 Act to the present. 
  Second, the remedy makes the disease worse. Regulators and regulation often have 
served as deterrents to technical innovation, both by incumbent monopolists and of course by 
potential entrants. Bell Labs was a famous source of invention, but AT&T was a ponderous and 
reluctant innovator. The framework of regulation and the principles of administrative law give 
incumbent producers great leverage in preventing entry by competitors. This, in turn, reduces the 
incumbent’s own incentive to innovate.  
  Third, there is no body of learning, or experience from other contexts, suggesting that 
these failures might be remedied significantly by “better” regulatory practices. The long run 
                                                           
16 For the high court’s attempts to resolve some of the numerous disputes, see Verizon Communications Inc. et al. v 
Federal Communications Commission 535 U.S. 467 (2002); Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of Md. 535 
U.S. 635 (2002); Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  9 
interests of consumers arguably are better served by unregulated (and therefore hopefully 
shorter-lived) monopoly than by regulated (and therefore likely semi-permanent) monopoly.  
  With the possible exception of the platonic isolation approach of the original Justice 
Department/AT&T 1982 settlement agreement, which was never implemented, no approach to 
controlling anticompetitive behavior by vertically integrated regulated monopolists in the 
communications industry has been successful, and most have injured consumer interests. If 
consumers really did face the imminent prospect of last mile monopoly and anticompetitive 
access discrimination in broadband services, a doubtful proposition at best, the sad lesson of 
history is that the “net neutrality” remedy is a cure far worse than the feared disease.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 